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CHAPTER 7 
State and Local Taxatr· on 
VIRGINIA c. HALL* 
§7.1. Introduction. The Survey year was a fairly full one in the 
development of the tax laws of the commonwealtl. A major tax bilP was passed, and several cases involving issues of some importance 
were decided by the Supreme Judicial Court. This hapter will discuss 
the various major taxes separately, and in each case deal with the type 
of development (legislative or judicial) which was of most importance 
during the Survey year. A final section will deal with the large volume 
of tax cases that went off on procedural groundsidUring the Survey 
year. The abundance of these cases brings home t the practicing at-
torney the importance in the tax area, as in any oth r, of choosing the 
proper forum, meeting all relevant filing deadlines, and preserving an 
adequate record on appeal. 
§7.2. Personal Income Taxes: Chapter 555(,Of the Acts of 
1971. Several of the income tax cases decided uring the Survey 
year, like those of the past few years, l involved qu stions arising as a 
result of the rather hasty superposition by chapter 555 of the Acts of 
1971 of federal concepts upon much of the structure of the old Mas-
sachusetts law regarding the taxation of income under chapter 62 of 
the General Laws. However, since chapter 62 WaStgain substantially 
amended in 1973 in an effort to resolve these di ficulties, 2 some of 
the cases arising after the 1971 amendment but rior to the 1973 
amendment are already of historical interest only. 
In B. W. Company v. State Tax Commission,3 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that under chapter 62 of the General aws, as amended 
through chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, a busine s trust with trans-
*VIRGINIA C. HALL is an associate specializing in taxation in the law firm of Ropes & 
Gray, Boston. 
§7.1. 1 Acts of 1975, c. 684. I 
§7.2. 1 E.g., Ingraham v. State Tax Comm'n, 1975 Mass. Ad~. Sh. 2160, 2163-64, 
331 N.E.2d 795, 796; Barnes v. State Tax Comm'n, 336 Mass. 589, 593, 296 N.E.2d 
510,512 (1973). 
2 Acts of 1973, c. 723, amending G.L. c. 62. 
31976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 836, 345 N.E.2d 884. For a discussion of the Appellate Tax 
Board's decision, see Hines, State & Local Taxation, 1975 ANN. SU~V. MASS. LAW § 11.22, 
at 241-42. I 
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ferable shares, which was treated for federal tax purposes as a 
corporation,4 was entitled to exclude from its income the gain from a 
sale of assets which qualified for nonrecognition of gain under section 
337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the "Code").5 The Court 
allowed the exclusion because section 2(a) of chapter 62 equates Mas-
sachusetts gross income with federal gross income and, therefore, 
since the "taxpayer's gain clearly was not part of its federal gross in-
come ... [such gain] literally ... was not part of the taxpayer's Mas-
sachusetts gross income .... "6 
In reaching this result, the Court rejected the Commission's argu-
ment that business trusts are taxed as persons for Massachusetts in-
come tax purposes. The Court noted that chapter 555 of the Acts of 
1971 "directs only that such a trust be considered to be an individual 
(and not a corporation) '[i]n determining the Code deductions allowable 
to such ... trust.' "7 The Court reasoned that, in light of such a provi-
sion specifically referring to the determination of deductions, the ab-
sence of a similar provision regarding gross income was significant, 
indicating that "[i]f the Legislature had intended that a trust with 
transferable shares should be treated as if it were an individual in de-
termining its gross income, it could have said SO."8 The Court also re-
jected the Commission's argument that a literal application of the fed-
eral income tax definition of gross income would not permit the ap-
preciation in the taxpayer's assets to be taxed at all by Massachusetts 
on liquidation, since the taxpayer in 1964 had entered into an agree-
ment under section 1 of chapter 62 of the General Laws as then 
amended,9 which barred the taxation of its dividends. lO In response to 
this argument, the Court noted, without deciding the point, that the 
trust's shareholders might be subject to tax on any gain which they 
realized from the liquidation of the trust. 11 
In light of the 1973 amendments to chapter 62 of the General 
Laws,12 the result reached in B. W. Company would no longer be possi-
ble. As amended by section 2 of chapter 723 of the Acts of 1973, sec-
tion 8(a) of chapter 62 now provides that the Massachusetts adjusted 
gross income of a corporate trust shall be determined as if such trust 
were a resident natural person, with certain exceptions not here rel-
evant. Therefore, for the purpose of determining Massachusetts in-
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 838 n.3, 345 N.E.2d at 886 n.3. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 7701(a). 
5 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 836, 345 N.E.2d at 885. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337. 
6 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 839, 345 N.E.2d at 886. 
7[d., 345 N.E.2d at 887, citing G.L. c. 62, § 8(a), as amended through Acts of 1971, c. 
555, § 5 (emphasis added by the Court). 
8 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 839-40, 345 N.E.2d at 886. 
• G.L. c.62, §§ l(c) and (e), as amended through Acts of 1935, c. 489, §6, and Acts of 
1963, c. 496, respectively. 
10 [d. at 840-41, 345 N.E.2d at 887. 
"[d. at 841-42, 345 N.E.2d at 887. 
12 See Acts of 1973, c. 723. 
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come tax, the nonrecognition provisions of section 337 of the Code 
are no longer available to corporate trusts.13 
In Forte Investment Fund v. State Tax Commission,14 the issue was not 
the allowability of an exclusion from gross income but rather of a de-
duction therefrom for a business trust under chapter 62, as amended 
through chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971.15 Section 8(a) of chapter 62 
as amended through 1971 specifically provided that for purposes of 
determining the Code deductions allowable to a business trust the 
trust was to be considered an individual.16 As a result, the Court held 
that an investment trust could not deduct investment expenses be-
cause such expenses, considered as those of an individual, were not 
"trade or business" expenses deductible under section 62 of the 
Code,t7 even though they would be considered trade or business ex-
penses of a corporation.18 The Court reserved judgment with respect 
to whether it would reach the same result if the business trust had 
made short-term investments expecting to profit from fluctuations in 
a securities or commodities market, rather than long-term investments 
with the expectation of profit from the success of the businesses in 
which the trust had invested. 19 The distinction between the two types 
of investments seems to turn on whether the trust is expecting to 
profit primarily from its own judgment and trading activity or from 
the efforts of the management of the corporations in which it has 
invested.20 
In Dogon v. State Tax Commisison,21 the Court decided an issue raised 
by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971 by relying on section 63(d) of 
chapter 62 of the General Laws, a section which was substantially re-
written in 1973.22 The question raised was whether the gain from an 
installment payment received in 1971 from a 1965 sale of foreign real 
estate, which sale was reported on the installment basis for federal 
13 "Corporate trusts" are defined as including any trust, the beneficial interest of 
which is represented by transferable shares. G.L. c. 62, § 1(j), as amended through Acts of 
1973, c. 723, § 2. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 546, 343 N.E.2d 420. For a discussion of the Appellate Tax 
Board's decision, see Hines, State & Local Taxation, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.22, 
at 240-41. 
ISld. at 546-47, 343 N.E.2d at 421. 
18 See text at note 7 supra. . 
17 See G.L. c. 62, § 2(b), as amended through Acts of 1971, c. 555, incorporating INT. REV. 
CODE OF 1954, § 62. 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 549, 343 N.E.2d at 422. This result follows without diffi-
culty under the law as in effect in 1971 and 1972, but it is made even clearer by Acts of 
1973, c. 723, which amended c. 62, § 2 so as to permit the deduction of expenses al-
lowed under § 62 of the Code only from Part B (earned) income to the extent of such 
income. See G.L. c. 62, § 2(d). If there is an excess of deductions allowable under § 62 
over earned income, it may be applied to that portion of unearned income which is "ef-
fectively connected with the active trade or business of the taxpayer." G.L. c. 62, § 
2(c)(I). 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 549,343 N.E.2d at 422. 
I. See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 192,202 (1963). 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1915,351 N.E.2d 854. 
II Acts of 1973, c. 723, § II, amending G.L. c. 62, § 63. 
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purposes, was subject to Massachusetts taxation. 23 Instead of deciding 
the fundamental question of whether a 1971 tax statute could con-
stitutionally tax gain arising from a 1965 sale, the gain from which 
was not taxable at the time of the sale,24 the Court decided in favor of 
the taxpayers' position by relying on section 63(d) of chapter 62, as 
added by section 18 of chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971.25 Section 
63(d) provided that if the Commission did not "permit" a taxpayer to 
use the installment method for state tax purposes and the taxpayer 
was using that method for federal purposes, the taxpayer's income for 
any year in which he had installment income for federal purposes was 
to be "adjusted accordingly."26 This section was intended to prevent 
gain which was clearly taxable27 from being taxed twice by Mas-
sachusetts due to the different methods of reporting for federal and 
state purposes. The Court held, however, that since in this case the 
taxpayers had never applied for permission to report on the install-
ment basis, "the conditions of § 63(d) are met" and therefore "the in-
stallment gain taxable for Federal tax purposes in 1971 must be re-
moved from the taxpayers' income subject to taxation."28 The Court 
summarily rejected the Commission's argument that section 63(d) ap-
plied only where a taxpayer had requested permission to use the in-
stallment method and had been refused, stating that there was "no 
authority or legislative history to support these contentions."29 How-
ever, it could hardly be expected that authority could be found under 
a rather obscure section which was in force for only two years, and 
there was probably no meaningful legislative history of the section at 
all. On the contrary, it would appear that neither authority nor legis-
lative history would be necessary to support the Commission's in-
terpretation of the section, which was in accordance with the section's 
obvious purpose and the plain meaning of the words used. 
In 1973, section 63 was entirely rewritten so as to give a taxpayer 
an election, comparable to that under the Code, to report an "install-
ment transaction" on the installment basis.30 The Court noted this 
change in a footnote and expressed no opinion as to the result which 
would have followed if section 63, as so amended, had applied in 
1971.31 Thus, there has been no final resolution of the constitutional 
23 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1916-17,351 N.E.2d at 855. 
24 The Court specifically noted that it need not reach the constitutional question. [d. 
at 1917 n.3, 351 N.E.2d at 855 n.3. 
25/d. at 1919,351 N.E.2d at 856. 
26 G.L. C. 62, § 63(d), added by Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 18, quoted at 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1918,351 N.E.2d at 855. 
27 The section refers to the taxpayer's "income subject to taxation." G.L. c. 62, § 
63(d), added by Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 18, quoted at 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1918, 351 
N.E.2d at 855. 
28 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1919,351 N.E.2d at 856. 
29 [d. at 1920, 351 N.E.2d at 856. 
30 G.L. c. 62, § 63, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 723, §§ 11, 19. 
31 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1919 n. 6, 351 N.E.2d at 856 n.6. 
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issue raised and skirted in Dogon. 32 Of course, it is fundamental that a 
constitutional question will not be decided where there is some other 
basis for decision even if that basis is only temporary, but in this situa-
tion it is submitted that there was in fact no other basis, although the 
Court purported to find one, and the Court should have squarely 
faced the constitutional issue. 
In Elwood v. State Tax Commission,33 the Supreme Judicial Court de-
cided a very narrow issue created by section 5 of chapter 555 of the 
Acts of 1971 in large part by reference to the law prior to 1971 and 
to the law after the enactment of section 2 of chapter 723 of the Acts 
of 1973, which latter section the Court described as "in part 
curative."34 In the case of a husband and wife filing a joint return, 
section 5 of chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971 permitted a personal ex-
emption of $2,600, with an additional exemption of up to $2,000 for 
the "salary, wages or other compensation" of the spouse with the 
smaller amount of such income.35 The Commissioner took the posi-
tion that a spouse with self-employment income was not eligible for 
the additional exemption.36 Prior to 1971, however, it was clear that 
the then comparable exemption extended to working spouses with 
self-employment income.37 Similarly, section 2 of chapter 723 of the 
Acts of 1973 specified the same result for 1973 and later years. 38 Ac-
cordingly, although the Court conceded that the issue could not read-
ily be resolved from the face of the statute as in effect for 1971 and 
1972,39 it held that the exemption included self-employment income 
for those years since to hold otherwise would create "an odd interreg-
num in the law."40 
§7.3. Personal Income Taxes: New Hampshire Commuter 
Tax. The March 1975 decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Austin v. New Hampshire,l holding the New Hampshire commuter 
tax unconstitutional,2 had some tangible effects during the Survey year 
on Massachusetts residents who had paid the tax. After the Austin 
32 It appears that in at least one case involving taxes arising since 1973, the Commis-
sioner has in fact taken the position that Dogon is not applicable. Johnson v. State Tax 
Commission (hearing before the Appellate Tax Board) Docket No. 75031. (Oct. 13, 
1976). 
331975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3432, 338 N.E.2d 812. Brody v. State Tax Comm'n, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3441, 338 N.E.2d 556, a rescript opinion decided the same day as 
Elwood, involved the same issue. 
34 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3439,338 N.E.2d at 815. 
3sld. at 3433,338 N.E.2d at 813. 
36/d. at 3435, 338 N.E.2d at 814. 
37 C.L. c. 62, § 5B(2)(i}, as amended through Acts of 1966, c. 698, § 9. 
38 C.L. c. 62, § 3B(b)(2)(A}, as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2. 
39 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3436, 338 N.E.2d at 814. 
40 ld. at 3440, 338 N.E.2d at 815-16. 
§7.3. '420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
2 The Supreme Court held that a state commuters income tax based solely on the in-
comes of nonresidents and not offset by other taxes imposed solely on residents, vio-
lates the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. ld. at 
665-66. 
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case, the Massachusetts Attorney General, together with the Attorneys 
General of Vermont and Maine, sued New Hampshire to collect the 
approximate amount of the tax that had been unconstitutionally col-
lected from citizens of their respective states for which the plaintiff 
states had allowed a credit.3 The Supreme Court denied recovery, 
stating that the injury was of their own making since the plaintiff 
states need not have allowed a credit for the tax.4 The Commissioner 
of Corporations and Taxation accordingly proposed to assess an addi-
tional tax in the amount of the credit on all Massachusetts residents to 
whom a credit had been allowed. 5 At the same time, New Hampshire 
took the position that individuals could not obtain a refund of the 
commuter tax because of the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
suit brought by the affected states, even though the Austin case itself 
was a claim for abatement by an individual. 6 Thus the Massachusetts 
taxpayer who had paid the New Hampshire tax was caught in the 
middle. Fortunately, the Massachusetts Commissioner later revised his 
position and stated that he would not pursue collection of taxes for 
years prior to 1975, during only three months of which the commuter 
tax was in effect. 7 
§7.4. Personal Income Taxes. Legislation. After the flurry of leg-
islative activity with respect to the income tax in the past several 
years, the Survey year was a very quiet period. The primary amend-
ment to chapter 62 during the Survey year was the increase in the rate 
of tax on unearned income to ten percent and the imposition of a 
seven and one-half percent surtax. 1 In addition, Massachusetts 
adopted an optional one dollar per taxpayer contribution to the state 
election campaign fund comparable to that instituted for federal pur-
poses in 1974.2 The Massachusetts law, however, requires the tax-
3 Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam). The opinion also dis-
cusses a similar complaint brought by Pennsylvania against New Jersey. Id. at 661. 
4 Id. at 664. 
5 Conversation with Ms. Joyce Hampers, Associate Commissioner of Corporations and 
Taxation. 
6Id. According to Ms. Hampers, New Hampshire claimed, in addition, that the com-
muter tax in Austin was valid for the years prior to 1975, when it was declared uncon-
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court. 
7 Department of Corporations and Taxation, Technical Information Release: New 
Hampshire Commuters Income Tax, TIR-76-1 (August 27, 1976). The last paragraph 
of the release indicates that the Commissioner intended to press for collection of the 
tax for 1975. Since the release, however, and after the Survey year, the Legislature 
adopted a bill authorizing the Attorney General to commence legal proceedings in be-
half of the residents of Massachusetts to recover from New Hampshire the taxes paid 
by Massachusetts commuters. Acts of 1977, c. 102. The Commissioner has indicated in-
formally that collection of the 1975 taxes will be held in abeyance pending the outcome 
of the suit. Conversation with Ms. Joyce Hampers, Associate Commissioner of Corpora-
tions and Taxation. See Boston Herald American, March 27, 1977, at 21, col. 4. 
§7.4. 1 G.L. c. 62, § 4(a), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, §§ 41,88. 
• G.L. c. 62, § 6C, as added by Acts of 1975, c. 774, § 4. Compare INT. REV. CODE of 
1954, § 6096. 
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payer to pay one dollar in addition to his tax liability, whereas the 
analogous federal option provides for the application of one dollar of 
the taxpayer's tax liability to a campaign fund. 
§7.5. Corpor~tion Excise Tax: Definition of "Engaged Exclu-
sively" in Securities Investment. In recent years section 38B of 
chapter 63 of the General Laws which provides favorable tax treat-
ment for corporations that are "engaged exclusively in buying, selling, 
dealing in, or holding securities on [their] own behalf and not as a 
broker,"! has been the subject of several decisions. In the latest in this 
line of cases, State Tax Commission v. The PoGM CO.,2 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, reversing the Appellate Tax Board,3 took a narrow ap-
proach to section 38B and held that a corporation that received in-
come from a note secured by a mortgage on property it had sold was 
not engaged "exclusively" in securities investment and thus not enti-
tled to favorable tax treatment under the section.4 
PoGM involved a manufacturing corporation which decided in 1967 
to cease its manufacturing activities and enter the investment field. In 
selling its assets the corporation was forced to take back a note for 
$59,000 secured by a mortgage on the real estate it sold.5 In the years 
after 1967, the corporation operated as a security company and was 
considered a personal holding company under federal income tax 
law. 6 The value of the corporation's total assets was not stated, but it 
appeared that interest on the mortgage note and gain from the sale of 
the real estate constituted about thirty-seven percent of the 
corporation'S total income during its 1971 tax year. 7 
The corporation applied for but was denied classification as a se-
curity corporation under section 38B and was therefore found liable 
for taxes as a domestic business corporation.8 On appeal, the Appel-
late Tax Board held that the circumstances surrounding the 
corporation'S acquisition of the promissory note secured by a mort-
gage on the real estate it had formerly owned did not prevent the 
company from qualifying as a security corporation under section 38B 
of chapter 63 of the General Laws.9 In so holding, the Board relied 
on two of its earlier cases, Arcade Malleable Iron Co. v. State Tax 
§7.5. 1 G.L. c. 63, § 38B(a)(b). 
2 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 289, 341 N.E.2d 285. 
3 The Appellate Tax Board's decision is reported at 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS.' 
200-426 (1975). For a discussion of the Board's decision, see Hines, State and Local Taxa-
tion, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.26, at 247-48. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 292-93,341 N.E.2d at 287. 
S [d. at 290,341 N.E.2d at 286. 
• /d. at 290-91, 341 N.E.2d at 286. 
7/d. The rest of the corporation'S total income for that year came from interest on 
Treasury Bills, commercial paper, and savings accounts. Docket No. 64515, 2 CCH 
STATE TAX REP., MASS. '200-426, at 10,345 (1975). 
8 Docket No. 64515, 2 CCH STATE TAX. REP., MASS. 11200-426, at 10,345. 
• [d. at 10, 346-47. 
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Commission 10 and A&S Inc. v. State Tax Commission,l1 both unappealed, 
in which the Board had decided that former manufacturing corpora-
tions qualified under section 38B even though, in the one case, the 
corporation continued to hold title to unmarketable real estate12 and, 
in the other, it was still in the process of liquidating some of its assets 
during the year in question. 13 In fact, such reliance in PoGM would 
appear to have been unnecessary for it was a considerably easier case 
than either Arcade or A&S. In PoGM, all the corporation's assets were 
securities held for income, whereas in the earlier cases the corpora-
tions had not yet disposed of all the assets used in their previous 
business. 
On appeal, however, the Supreme Judicial Court held that PoGM 
was not a security company because it did not acquire the mortgage 
note "in the normal course of investment," but rather "as the appar-
ently unavoidable consequence of the circumstances under which it 
had to sell its real estate."14 Therefore, the note was not "the type of 
security which the Legislature had in mind in § 38B."15 The Court 
purported to rely on its decision in Industrial Finance Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission,16 where a corporation in the business of lending money 
was found not to be a security corporation even though its only assets 
were notes,u That case, however, seems clearly distinguishable. 
There, as the Court pointed out in its decision, the corporation's 
business was not investment but rather lending money!8 whereas in 
PoGM the corporation's major business was the holding of securities, 
including the note in question. 19 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court in PoGM did not discuss 
Arcade and A&S, the Court, by implication, overruled those prior Ap-
pellate Tax Board decisions. It is clear that the Court would find that 
neither of the former manufacturing corporations involved in Arcade 
and A&S would qualify as a security company under section 38B since 
both companies actually retained business assets during the taxable 
years in question.20 It is submitted that the Court in PoGM took an 
unjustifiably narrow approach to section 38B. It would seem that the 
relevant test should be not how a corporation's securities were ac-
quired, but rather whether they were in fact held as investments. 
10 Docket No. 46882, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. '200-274 (1968). 
11 [1953-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. '200-175 (1963). 
12 Arcade, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. '200-274, at 10,072, 10,074 (1968). 
13A & S, [1953-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. '200-175 at 
10,485 (1963). 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 292, 341 N.E.2d at 287. 
ISld. 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967, 326 N.E.2d 1. 
171d. at 977-78, 326 N.E.2d -at 5. The Court stated that the corporation did not hold 
its promissory notes for investment in the "necessary sense" of G.L. c. 63, § 38 B. 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 977-78,326 N.E.2d at 5. 
IB 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 977,326 N.E.2d at 5. 
19 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 290-91, 341 N.E.2d at 286. 
20 See text at notes 12-13 supra. 
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§7.6. Corporation Excise Tax: Gross Income: Interest Reduction 
Payments. Two cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during 
the Survey year both involved the same issue under the excise tax im-
posed on urban redevelopment corporations by section 10 of chapter 
121A of the General Laws, prior to its amendment by section 7 of 
chapter 827 of the Acts of 1975. Morville House, Inc. v. Commissioner l 
and Rosenthal v. Commissioner2 raised the question whether "gross in-
come ... from all sources," as used in section 10, included "interest 
reduction payments" made by the federal government3 directly to the 
mortgagee of a chapter 121A project. 4 The effect of such payments is 
to reduce to one percent the effective rate of the mortgage to the 
mortgagor, with the government making up the rest.5 The Commis-
sioner argued that the payments represent the discharge of an 
indebtedness of the mortgagor and therefore are income to him. 6 
This position was supported by a recent ruling in which the Internal 
Revenue Service held that such payments were indeed "gross income" 
under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code. 7 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court explicitly stated that the measure of gross income in section 
10 is the same as that described in section 61 of the Code,s but 
nonetheless held that the payments in question were not income 
under section 10.9 
The opinion of the Court is strained and unpersuasive. First, it 
states that the payments are in the nature of a subsidy similar to wel-
fare or food stamps.lO However, as the Internal Revenue Service 
pointed out in its ruling, the payments are for the benefit of the ten-
ant, not the mortgagor as such, and therefore only the tenant should 
be immune from the tax consequences which would otherwise 
follow. 11 Second, the Court differentiated the situations present in 
Morville and Rosenthal from the usual constructive receipt situation on 
§7.6. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 773, 344 N.E.2d 878. 
2 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 788, 344 N.E.2d 884. Rosenthal was decided the same day as 
Morville and adopted the reasoning in Morville without further elaboration. rd. at 792, 
344 N.E.2d at 886. Therefore most of the discussion in the text will be based on 
Morville. 
3 Such payments are made pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970). 
'Rosenthal, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 791, 344 N.E.2d at 886; Morville, 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 773-74, 344 N .E.2d at 879. The issue was resolved legislatively by Acts of 1975, c. 
827, § 7, which amended § 10 so as to exclude explicitly from gross income "any pay-
ments made by any governmental unit to or on behalf of such corporation .... " G.L. c. 
121A, § 10 '9. The amendment does not apply to projects undertaken prior to its ef-
fective date of March, 1976. 
5 Rosenthal, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 790,344 N.E.2d at 885. 
8 Morville, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 778, 344 N.E.2d at 881. 
7 See Rev. Rul. 76-75, 1976-( C. B. 14. This revenue ruling was published just prior 
to the date of the Morville and Rosenthal opinions which came down on March 22, 1976. 
See [1976] 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) '6475, at 71,373 (March 10, 1976). 
• Morville, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 779,344 N.E.2d at 881. 
9 [d. at 775, 344 N.E.2d at 879. 
10 [d. at 780, 344 N.E.2d at 882. 
11 Rev. Rul. 76-75,1976-1 C. B. 14,15. 
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the ground that, in the former, the mortgagor was not permitted to 
receive the payments under federallaw. 12 Finally, the Court held that 
neither Morville nor Rosenthal presented the usual discharge of in-
debtedness situation in that the payments by the government to the 
mortgagee were essentially worked out directly between them, and the 
government's obligation to make the payments ran directly to the 
mortgagee and not to the plaintiffs. 13 Neither of these latter two 
points, however, would seem to affect the basic fact that the payments 
are a discharge of the mortgagor's liability, at least in that the mort-
gagor would otherwise have to pay the liability himself. 
It is difficult to believe that the Court was in fact very much swayed 
by the reasons it cited in its decision. Rather, it seems likely that the 
Court was aware that a contrary result would work a considerable 
hardship on the mortgagor-a consequence which would not arise 
under the Code because of the difference between the methods of 
taxation under the Code and section 10. In the ruling cited by the 
Court, the Internal Revenue Service indicated not only that interest 
reduction payments are includable in income, but also that they are 
deductible as interest. 14 On the other hand, section 10 of chapter 
121A as in effect prior to its 1975 amendment taxed "gross income" 
without any offsetting deductions. 15 Thus, inclusion of the payments 
in federal income would have no effect on the federal tax, but inclu-
sion in Massachusetts income would have a considerable and burden-
some effect in terms of the Massachusetts tax. It is surprising that the 
Court did not therefore differentiate "gross income" as used in sec-
tion 10 from the federal concept and decide the case on the basis of 
the particular structure of the state excise tax. 
The Court might also have cited the 1975 amendment of section 
1016 as casting some light on the Legislature'S original intent, as it did 
in an analogous situation in Elwood v. State Tax Commission,17 thereby 
reaching the conclusion that the payments in Morville and Rosenthal 
were not includable in income by a less strained route. Instead, the 
Court chose to embrace unnecessarily the federal concept of gross 
income,18 and then to struggle to reach a result which that concept 
did not really permit. 
12 Morville, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 781, 344 N.E.2d at 882. Payments by the federal 
government go to mortgagees "on behalf of the owner of a rental housing project .... " 
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(a) (1970). Thus, under the federal program the mortgagor never 
receives any payments. 
13 Morville, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 784,344 N.E.2d at 883-84. 
14 Rev. Rul. 76-75, 1976-1 C.B. 14, 15. See note 7 supra . 
.. C.L. c. 121A, § 10, as in effect prior to Acts of 1975, c. 827, § 7. 
16 Acts of 1975, c. 827, § 7. See note 4 supra. 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3432, 3439-40, 338 N.E.2d 812, 815-16. For a further discus-
sion of Elwood, see §7.2, at notes 33-40 supra. . 
18 The Court turned to the federal concept by reference to C.L. c. 63, § 30, cl. 5, 
since under C.L. c. 121A, § 10 '5, as in effect prior to Acts of 1975, c. 827, § 7, C.L. c. 63 
is applicable in all matters of assessment, collection, payment, and abatement of the § 
10 tax. Morville, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 779, 344 N.E.2d 881. However, it does not follow 
that the operative terms of § 10 are to be defined by reference to c. 63. 
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§7.7. Corporation Excise Tax: Machinery and Equipment 
Exemption. One issue that appeared to have been laid to rest by the 
1973 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in State Tax Commission v. 
MSF Leasing Corp. 1 was raised again in a case decided by the Appellate 
Tax Board during the Survey year.2 The issue is whether a corpora-
tion whose business is the leasing of machinery and equipment, rather 
than the use of such equipment directly, is eligible for the partial ex-
emption from tax provided by section 30(7) of chapter 63 of the Gen-
eral Laws as amended through section 1 of chapter 539 of the Acts of 
1969.3 The Commissioner has taken the position since the passage of 
the exemption in 1962 that a corporation leasing machinery and 
equipment is not eligible for the exemption, on the theory that since 
the property of such a corporation is exempt from local taxation as 
"stock in trade" under clause sixteenth of section 5 of chapter 59, it 
cannot be considered "machinery" for purposes of chapter 63. 4 Con-
versely, the Commissioner has indicated that if leased machinery is 
considered machinery for purposes of chapter 63, it should also be 
considered machinery for purposes of chapter 59 and, being machin-
ery of a business rather than a manufacturing corporation, should not 
be exempt from local taxation.s 
In MSF Leasing, the Court, in a brief rescript opinion, held that a 
corporation whose business was the leasing of machinery to its parent 
was entitled to the exemption, but the Court did not deal explicitly 
with the Commissioner's argument as outlined above.6 As a result the 
Commissioner did not feel that the Court adequately dealt with his 
position and has been attempting to limit the precedential effect of 
the case to parent-subsidiary situations such as was involved in MSF 
Leasing. 7 Apparently the Commissioner has in effect been seeking an 
opportunity to relitigate the entire issue and is not seriously maintain-
ing that a distinction should be made between parent-subsidiary leas-
ing arrangements and others. However, the Commissioner has lost the 
first round of this new battle. In Granite Computer Leasing Corp. v. State 
7.7. '363 Mass. 876, 292 N.E.2d 862 (1973). 
2 Granite Computer Leasing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, Docket Nos. 68898-68901 
(August 13, 1976) summarized at 2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. '11200-465. 
3 Section 30(7), prior to the passage of Acts of 1970, c. 634, provided a 5-year exemp-
tion from the tangible property measure of the tax for machinery and equipment with 
a useful life of 8 years or more which is exempt from local taxation. See Acts of 1962, c. 
756, § 2, for the text of the provision allowing the 5-year exemption. Although the ex-
emption was removed by Acts of 1970, c. 634, § I, § 6 of c. 634 permits corporations 
that had already qualified for the exemption to continue to take it for the rest of the 5 
year period, so that an exemption could be taken through 1973. 
4 MSF Leasing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, Docket Nos. 5517, 53545, 53700, 2 CCH 
TAX. REP .. MASS. '200-339, at 10,209 (1971), affd, 363 Mass. 876, 876, 292 N.E.2d 862, 
863 (1973). 
5 This view is based upon a memorandum from a meeting with the Commissioner on 
February 13, 1974. The memorandum is on file at the offices of the ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
6363 Mass. at 876,292 N.E.2d at 862 (1973). 
7 See note 5 supra. 
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Tax Commission,s the availability of the exemption was once again 
raised, and the Appellate Tax Board held that a corporation that 
leased computers to unrelated customers was entitled to the 
exemption.9 The Board again did not specifically deal with the argu-
ment raised by the Commissioner, but rather relied exclusively on the 
MSF Leasing case. tO 
§7.S. Corporation Excise Tax: Legislation. The legislative 
changes in the corporation excise tax during the Survey year were di-
rected toward increasing revenue and thus primarily involved rate 
changes. Higher rates were imposed on banks,t domestic 
corporations,2 foreign corporations,3 and security corporations.4 In 
addition, the three factor apportionment fraction used in determining 
the income measure of the tax imposed on domestic corporations that 
have business activity taxable both within and without Massachusetts 
was changed by doubling the weight to be given to the sales factor 
8 Docket Nos. 68898-68901 (August 13, 1976) summarized at 2 CCH TAX REP" MASS . 
• 200-465. 
9 [d. 
10 [d. After the end of the Survey year, the case was appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court and later withdrawn. Nos. SJC-833-836 (January 19, 1977). 
§7.8. I G.L. c. 63, §§ 2, II, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, §§ 43, 44. Section 2 
formerly taxed banks at a rate equal to that assessed on other financial corporations, 
but in no event higher than ten percent. G.L. c. 63, § 2 as amended through Acts of 1966, 
c. 14, § 9. Section 2 now taxes all banks at the rate of twelve and fifty-four one hun-
dredths percent. The 1975 amendment increased the annual excise tax imposed on sav-
ings banks, co-operative banks, and savings and loan associations under G.L. c. 63, § II 
as amended through Acts of 1966, c. 14, § II, as follows: in subparagraph (a) of § II "six 
hundred twenty-seven one thousandths percent" was substituted for "one-half of one 
percent," and "one-sixteenth" was substituted for "one-twientieth;" and in subparagraph 
(b) of § II "one and two hundred fifty-four one thousandths percent" was substituted 
for "one percent," and "one-sixteenth" was substituted for "one-twientieth." In addition, 
surtax equal to 10 percent of the sum of taxes due under § II of G.L. c. 63, plus any 
surtax which may be imposed on savings banks, co-operative banks, and state or federal 
savings and loans associations subject to G.L. c. 63, § II, was imposed upon such banks 
or loan associations for taxable years ending on or after October 31, 1975 and before 
October 31, 1976. Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 89. A similar ten percent surtax was imposed 
on all corporations, banks, or other entities taxable under any provision of G.L. c. 63 
other than § II. Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 89. The fourteen percent surtax formerly im-
posed by Acts of 1969, c. 546, § 18, which applied, inter alia, to taxes levied under G.L. 
c. 63, § II, was amended so as to no longer apply to § II. Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 85. 
2 G.L. c. 63, § 32(a)(2), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 48. The rate was raised 
from seven and one half percent to eight and thirty-three hundredths percent of net 
income. 
3 G.L. c. 63, § 39(a)(2), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 53. The rate was raised 
from seven and one half percent to eight and thirty-three one hundredths percent of 
its net income. 
• G.L. c. 63, § 38B, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 51. The rate under § 38B(a) 
for corporations that are not regulated investment or bank holding companies under 
the Internal Revenue Code defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851 and 1103 respec-
tively was changed from one percent to one and thirty-two one hundredths percent. 
The rate under § 38B(b) for regulated investment or bank holding companies was 
changed from one quarter of one percent to thirty-three one hundredths percent. 
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and increasing the denominator from three to four. 5 Finally, the ac-
tivities that would subject a domestic or foreign corporation to tax 
were specified.6 These activities were, in essence, the qualification to 
do business in the Commonwealth; the buying, selling, or procuring 
of services or property; the exercise of the corporation's charter; and 
the possession or use, in a corporate capacity, of any part of the 
corporation's capital, plant, or other property in Massachusetts. The 
avowed intention of the Legislature in specifying the activities that 
would subject a corporation to tax was "to require the payment of this 
excise ... for the enjoyment under the protection of the laws of the 
commonwealth, of the powers, rights, privileges and immunities de-
rived by reason of the corporate form of existence and operation."7 
§ 7.9. Inheritance Tax: Legislation. The primary legislative de-
velopment with respect to death taxes during the Survey year was the 
replacement of the inheritance tax by an estate tax based on the fed-
eral model. Chapter 65C of the General Laws, which was added by 
section 74 of chapter 684 of the Acts of 1975, imposes a tax at 
graduated rates ranging from five percent to sixteen percent on the 
estates of Massachusetts residents dying after December 31, 1975.1 
The Massachusetts gross estate is based on the federal gross estate as 
determined under the Internal Revenue Code as of January 1, 1975,2 
with the following differences. Real and tangible personal property 
having an actual situs outside the Commonwealth is excluded from 
the gross estate, and similarly deductions attributable to such property 
are not allowable.3 In addition, the marital deduction is measured by 
the Massachusetts rather than the federal adjusted gross estate. 4 The 
specific exemption for Massachusetts estate tax purposes is limited to 
$30,000,5 with an additional "disappearing exemption" of $30,000 in 
5 C.L. c. 63, §§ 38(c), 38(g), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, §§ 49, 50. Prior to the 
amendment, a corporation that had income from business activity which was taxable 
both within and without the Commonwealth determined its taxable net income appor-
tionable to the Commonwealth by multiplying its taxable net income by a fraction, the 
numerator of which was the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, 
and the denominator of which was three. C.L. c. 63, § 38(c), as amended through Acts of 
1966, c. 698, § 58. After the 1975 amendment, the numerator of the fraction was the 
property factor plus the payroll factor plus twice the sales factor, and the denominator 
of the fraction became four. C.L. c. 63, § 38(c), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 49. 
6 C.L. c. 63, §§ 32(1)-(3), 39(1)-(3), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, §§ 47, 52. Sec-
tion 47 relates to domestic corporations and § 52 to foreign corporations. 
7 C.L. c. 63, §§ 32(3), 39(3), as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, §§ 47, 52. 
§7.9. 1 C.L. c. 65C, § 2. The statute provides for an estate tax rate of 5% for estates 
of $50,000 or less. At the other end of the spectrum, estates of more than $4,000,000 
are taxed at $547,000 plus 16% of the excess over $4,000,000. 
2 C.L. c. 65C, § I(a)(f). For the provisions which define a federal gross estate, see INT. 
REV. CODE of 1954, § 2031 et seq. C.L. c. 65C replaces the provisions of C.L. 65 "and all 
other provisions of law imposing any tax on legacies and successions" for decedents 
dying on or after January I, 1976. Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 97. 
3 C.L. c. 65C, §§ I(f), 3(b). 
4 [d., § 3(b). 
5/d., § 3(a). 
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cases where the Massachusetts net estate6 is less than $60,000. 7 The 
"net estate" is a concept unique to Massachusetts and was added in 
order to make allowance for estates that have a substantial amount of 
debt.8 It figures not only in the disappearing exemption but also in a 
limitation of the estate tax to twenty percent of the excess of the Mas-
sachusetts net estate over $60,000.9 This limitation will apply to only a 
narrow range of estates-generally, those for which the net estate is 
between $60,000 and $70,000.10 
The new law continues the "sponge" tax, designed to use the max-
imum federal credit, apparently without suspending the similar tax al-
ready contained in chapter 65AY The only difference between the 
two is that chapter 65A extends the sponge tax to foreign decedents 
with intangible property in Massachusetts, whereas chapter 65C12 
makes no provision for taxation in such instances. 13 
For decedents dying prior to January 1, 1976, chapter 65, which 
provides for the taxation of legacies and successions, remains in full 
force and effect, except that future interests subject to powers of ap-
pointment that are included in the estate of the holder of the power 
under chapter 65C are not taxable to the donor of the power under 
chapter 65. 14 However, if the inheritance tax on the property has 
6 The Massachusetts net estate is defined as the Massachusetts gross estate less funeral 
expenses, claims against the estate, and unpaid indebtedness on property included in 
the estate, to the extent deductible under the Code and § 3 of C.L. c. 65C. C.L. c. 65C, 
§ l(g). 
7 C.L. c. 65C, § 3(a). The statute provides that if the Massachusetts net estate is 
$60,000 or less, the exemption shall equal the net estate. 
S Wheeler & Reynolds, The New Massachusetts Estate Tax-A Brief Narrative Summary, in 
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION-NEW ENGLAND LAW INSTITUTE. INC .. 
THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS ESTATE TAX, 16 (1976), [hereinafter cited as Wheeler & 
Reynoldsl. 
9 C.L. c. 65e, § 2(a). 
10 Wheeler & Reynolds, supra note 8, at 17. 
II Thus, under C.L. c. 65C § 2(b), if the maximum credit for state death taxes allow-
able under the federal estate tax, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2011, exceeds the estate 
tax imposed by Massachusetts, the amount of the excess is added to the tax imposed 
under the graduated rates found in C.L. c. 65C, § 2(a). An analogous provision is 
found in C.L. c. 65A, § 1, which is still in effect with respect to the estates of decedents 
who died prior to January 1, 1976. See Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 97. 
12 See note 2 supra. 
13 Chapter 65C taxes the estates of nonresident decedents only on the real estate and 
tangible personal property located in the Commonwealth. C.L. c. 65C, § 4. At the pres-
ent time, for purposes of determining the taxable estate of a nonresident the various 
exemptions and deductions attributable to the property are not allowed in full but only 
in the same proportion as the value of the Massachusetts gross estate bears to the fed-
eral gross estate. ld. This method of calculation could clearly work a substantial hard-
ship on nonresident decedents. After the close of the Survey year, the Legislature 
amended c.65C, § 4, so that a nonresident decedent's estate tax would be determined 
by applying a fraction, equal to the deceaent's Massachusetts gross estate divided by his 
total gross estate, to the tax which the decedent would pay on his total estate deter-
mined as if he were a Massachusetts resident. Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 90, effective 
January I, 1977. 
14 Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 97. 
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been settled prior to the death of the holder of the power of 
appointment, 1 5 the property will not be includable in the taxable es-
tate of the holder of the power.16 In an effort to settle the numerous 
estates of pre-1976 decedents with future interests outstanding, the 
Estate Tax Bureau announced in June a special settlement program 
under which it would settle future interest taxes at the rate of two 
percent on the first $100,000 of taxable property, four percent on the 
next $400,000, and seven percent on any excess. The offer is for a 
one year period, ending July 1, 1977, after which time "all offers to 
settle future interests will be strictly reviewed and settled only under 
assumptions most favorable to the commonwealth."17 The offer was 
designed to be, and for most estates probably is, more favorable than 
a settlement under the traditional procedure, which was based on the 
probable actual disposition of the property. IS In addition, it makes 
avoidance of the estate tax possible on property subject to a general 
power of appointment. 
§7.10. Inheritance Tax: Judicial Developments. Only two cases 
involving the inheritance tax under chapter 65 of the General Laws 
were decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year. l 
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. The Children's Hospital2 signaled a pos-
sible limitation on the Court's previously manifested willingness to in-
terpret a will in a way so as to minimize federal estate taxes. 3 Boston 
Safe involved the question whether future interest taxes on a marital 
deduction trust should be borne by the trust itself or by the residue of 
the estate, which residue was to go to charity under the will.4 The tax 
clause of the will fairly clearly placed all death taxes on the residue,s 
and the Court therefore rejected the charitable legatees' position that 
future interest taxes, unlike all other death taxes, should be borne by 
the trust itself.6 
Boston Safe was considerably complicated by the federal estate tax 
position of the estate. At the time the case was heard by the Supreme 
Judicial Court, a petition was pending before the Tax Court claiming 
.. See G.L. c. 65, § 14. 
16 Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 83. 
17 Form S.S.P.-l, Department of Corporations and Taxation, Estate Tax Bureau. 
16 See G.L. c. 65, §§ 13, 14. 
§7.10. 1 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. The Children's Hosp., 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1944, 351 N.E.2d 848; Ward v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 3140, 336 N.E.2d 862. 
21976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1944,351 N.E.2d 848. 
3 See Putnam v. Putnam, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1455, 1460-61, 1465,316 N.E.2d 729, 
734-35, 737, discussed in Slizewski, Trust and Estates, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 5.4, at 
81-86. 
41976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1944, 1946-47,351 N.E.2d 848, 849-50. 
old. at 1948-49, 351 N.E.2d at 850. The tax clause actually contained in the 
decedent's will was almost meaningless due to the apparent omission of a line. The 
Court, however, filled in the omission by reference to the will of the decedent's wife 
which had an identical tax c1ause.ld. at 1949 n.6, 351 N.E.2d at 850 n.6. 
61d. at 1949,1956,351 N.E.2d at 853. 
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that if Massachusetts law should require that the future interest taxes 
should be paid out of the marital trust property, such taxes would not 
reduce the value of the marital deduction as the Internal Revenue 
Service claimed. 7 The Supreme Judicial Court noted that if the estate 
prevailed in the Tax Court case and taxes were paid out of the trust, 
then the estate would save a substantial amount of federal taxes over 
what it would have to pay if future interest taxes were payable out of 
the residue, thereby reducing the estate's charitable deduction.s How-
ever, if the estate's petition to the Tax Court was not successful, the 
federal tax would be exactly the same regardless of whether the trust 
or the residue paid future interest taxes, since in either case the ap-
plicable deduction would be reduced by the amount of the tax.9 Ac-
cordingly, the Court apparently tried to reach its decision by refer-
ence to the terms of the will itself, uninfluenced by the possible fed-
eral tax consequences of the alternative positions before it. 10 In view 
of the uncertainty regarding the tax consequences of the two possible 
interpretations of the will, the Court's refusal to be guided by tax con-
siderations does not necessarily foreshadow a general tendency in this 
direction. 
Restricting its analysis to the terms of the will, the Court found 
support for its interpretation of the tax clause in another clause of the 
will stating that all questions with respect to the marital trust should 
be resolved so as to preserve the marital deduction,u It held further, 
no doubt correctly, that another provision of the will charging "taxes, 
expenses and other liabilities of the trusts hereunder" to the respec-
tive trusts had no application to death taxes,12 and that while the fail-
ure of the will to set up a method for payment of future interest taxes 
out of the residue was a "regrettable" omission, it was not 
insuperable. 13 
In the second case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during 
the Survey year, Ward v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation,14 the 
Court rejected a very strained attempt by the Commissioner to treat 
the credit against future interest taxes provided by section 3 of chap-
ter 65A of the General Laws as an asset which was itself subject to the 
inheritance tax. 1S The credit set forth in the section enables an estate 
that has to pay the "sponge" tax under chapter 65A to charge against 
it future interest taxes which subsequently become due. The Court 
7 See id. at 1955, n.12, 351 N.E.2d at 853 n.12. 
8Id. at 1952 n.8, 351 N .E.2d at 851-52 n.8. There was no question that future in-
terest taxes payable out of the residue, a charitable bequest, would reduce the charitable 
deduction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(c). 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1952 n.8, 351 N.E.2d at 851-52 n.8. 
I°Id. 
llId. at 1951 & n.7., 351 N.E.2d at 851 n.7. 
12Id. at 1952-53,351 N.E.2d at 852. 
13Id. at 1954-55, 351 N .E.2d at 853. 
14 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3140, 336 N.E.2d 862. 
IsId. at 3142-43, 336 N.E.2d at 863. 
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held that there was no indication that chapter 65A was intended as a 
mechanism to collect more inheritance taxes, as opposed to a means 
to tax to the limit of the maximum federal credit. I6 In addition, the 
Court held that the credit would not be considered property passing 
from the decedent within the meaning of section 1 of chapter 65.17 
The Court noted that even if the latter provision were considered 
ambiguous, "the Commissioner's undenied long standing prior in-
terpretation of G.L. c. 65, § 1, as to inheritance tax credits under G.L. 
c. 65A, § 3, would be entitled to great weight in resolving any such 
ambiguity against his present position."18 
§7.11. Property Taxes: Judicial Developments. Most of the cases 
in the area of property taxation during the Survey year involved ques-
tions under section 5 of chapter 59 of the General Laws, which sec-
tion contains the available exemptions from taxation. In Board of Asses-
sors of Saugus v. Baumann,1 the plaintiffs had sought a property tax 
exemption under clause eighteenth of section 5 of chapter 59 as 
"persons who by reason of age, infirmity and poverty are in the 
judgment of the assessors unable to contribute fully toward the public 
charges."2 The taxpayers appealed the assessors' denial of the exemp-
tion to the Appellate Tax Board, which held in favor of the 
taxpayers and granted an aQatement of the tax.3 On appeal by the 
board of assessors, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Appel-
late Tax Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under sec-
tion 6 of chapter 58A of the General Laws,4 which gives the Board 
jurisdiction to hear appeals only from clauses seventeenth and 
twenty-second of section 5. 
Although technically the position taken by the Court in Baumann is 
unarguable, over the years cases arising under other clauses of section 
5 have routinely been heard by the Appellate Tax Board and the 
Supreme Judicial Court without any jurisdictional question ever being 
raised.s It is conceivable, therefore, that the reason for the Court's de-
cision in Baumann was its unwillingness to second guess the assessors' 
judgment,6 and that the Court used the jurisdictional objection only as 
'"ld. at 3143 & n.l, 336 N.E.2d at 863-64 & n.1. 
171d. at 3144-45, 336 N.E.2d at 864. 
181d. at 3145 & n.3, 336 N.E.2d at 864 & n.3. 
§7.11. '1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 864, 345 N.E.2d 360. 
• ld. at 864, 345 N.E.2d at 361. 
31d. at 864-65, 345 N.E.2d at 361. 
• /d. at 865, 345 N.E.2d at 361. 
5 See, e.g, Mary C. Wheeler School, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Seekonk, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2311, 2312-13, 331 N.E.2d 888, 888-89 (appeal under cl.3d of § 5); Board of 
Assessors of Everett v. Formosi, 349 Mass. 727, 729-30, 212 N.E.2d 210, 211-12 (1965) 
(appeal under cl.4lst of § 5); Assessors of Boston v. Lamson, 316 Mass. 166, 173, 55 
N.E.2d 215, 219 (1944) (appeal under d.lOth of § 5). 
"This possibility is given added weight by the Court's statement that U[a] hardship 
abatement under d. Eighteenth is a matter in the discretion of the assessors." 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 865, 345 N.E.2d at 361. 
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an expedient method of disposing of the case, without considering the 
implications of its holding. In any event, both by highlighting the fact 
that the terms of section 6 of chapter 58A give the Appellate Tax 
Board only limited jurisdiction over appeals under section 5 and by 
applying the statute literally, the Court's decision invites assessors to 
take advantage of the jurisdictional ground as a means of obtaining 
the dismissal of appeals to the Board under section 5. It should be 
noted also that the jurisdictional question could probably be raised 
successfully for the first time on an appeal to the Supreme Judicial 
Court,7 by which time the period in which to pursue any other avenue 
of appeal might well have passed. Thus, so long as section 6 of chap-
ter 58A remains in effect in its present form,s the cautious taxpayer 
in the future will take any appeal not expressly authorized by that sec-
tion or by other statutes not to the Board but directly to the courts, 
for even though the Board and the Supreme Judicial Court might 
again be willing to ignore the jurisdictional objection, it is not certain 
that the assessors will likewise be willing. 
Of the cases decided on substantive grounds, four involved the 
question whether a corporation qualified as a "manufacturing corpo-
ration" under section 2 of chapter 58 of the General Laws, with the 
result that its property would be exempt from local taxation under 
section 5 of chapter 59.9 In Joseph T. Rossi Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission,IO the Supreme Judicial Court, acknowledging that it was a 
close case, held that the production of cut lumber by a sawmill was 
not "mere extraction, packaging and transportation of a raw material" 
but rather the production of a new product, and as such was "man-
ufacturing," even though the product was not "a finished product for 
the ultimate consumer."ll In Hopkinton LNG Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission,12 however, the Appellate Tax Board held that the pro-
cessing of natural gas into liquified natural gas did not create a new 
product and therefore was not "manufacturing."13 The Board 
reached the same conclusion in First Data Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission,14 in which it held that the conversion of information re-
ceived into different kinds of information by a digital computer "time 
sharing" system was not manufacturing but rather the performance of 
a service. 15 Finally, in a rather obvious decision, the Appellate Tax 
7 See New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. Board of Assessors, 1975 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 3018, 3027, 335 N.E.2d 897, 902, discussed at § 7.14, notes 17-21 infra. 
8 Shortly after the Baumann case was decided H. 4825 (1976) was introduced in the 
General Court to give the Appellate Tax Board jurisdiction to decide appeals under all 
the clauses of c. 59, § 5. The bill was rejected by the House on June 8, 1976. 
9 G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16th(3}. 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3408, 338 N.E.2d 557. 
11 ld. at 3413-14,338 N.E.2d at 559. 
12 Docket No. 69172 (April 16, 1976), summarized at 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS . 
• 200-457. 
131d. 
14 Docket No. 73623, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. 11 200-448 (1976). 
15/d. at 10,391, 10,392, 10,394. 
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Board held in Fernandes Super Markets, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 16 
that a supermarket with a bakery on the premises was not a manufac-
turing corporation by virtue of the bakery, where only 7.5 percent of 
its gross profits were from the sale of baked goods, and 12.6 percent 
of its employees were engaged in the bakery activityY 
United Church of Religious Science v. Board of Assessors of Attleboro, 18 in-
volved a novel claim under clause tenth of section 5 of chapter 59, 
which exempts "[p]ersonal property owned by ... religious organiza-
tions, whether or not incorporated, if the principal or income is used 
or appropriated for religious, benevolent or charitable purposes."19 A 
religious corporation, United Church of Religious Science, claimed 
that machinery and stock in trade of an electrical wire and cable 
manufacturing plant owned and operated by it was exempt from 
property taxes under the clause because the income from the opera-
tion was used for religious purposes.20 Literally, it seems that the ex-
emption should have applied, but the Appellate Tax Board under-
standably balked at such a holding which would grant a tax exemp-
tion to property used in a manner not even remotely related to a re-
ligious purpose.21 Nonetheless, in order to hold that the commercial 
use of the property was a bar to exemption, the Board had to take the 
position, unsupported by any previous case law, that clause tenth set 
up a dual requirement that both income and principal, rather than 
income or principal alone, must be used for religious purposes.22 
Board of Assessors of Melrose v. Driscoll23 involved the relatively re-
cently enacted exemption for real estate owned by veterans with "a 
disability rating of one hundred per cent as determined by the Vete-
rans Administration."24 The taxpayer had a 100 percent disability rat-
ing, but the rating was by its terms "based in part on unemployability" 
under section 4.16 of the Veterans Administration regulations,25 
16 Docket No. 74528,2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS .• 200-446 (1975). 
IT /d. at 10,388, 10,389. 
18 Docket Nos. 75003, 75639 (April 7, 1976), summarized at 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., 
Mass. '1200-455. 
19 G.L. C. 59, § 5, cl.l0th. 
20 Docket Nos. 75003, 75639 (April 7, 1976), summarized at 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., 
MASS. '!I 200-455. 
21 See Assessors of Boston v. Lamson, 316 Mass. 166, 55 N.E.2d 215 (1944), where 
the Court granted an exemption under cl.lOth for property used to print Christian Sci-
ence publications and a newspaper called The Christian Science Monitor. [d. at 169, 
175, 55 N.E.2d at 217, 220. Profits from the religious publications, after first being 
used to make up the deficit sustained by the Monitor, went to First Church of Christ, 
Scientist in Boston. [d. at 170,55 N.E.2d at 218. In granting the exemption the Court 
stressed the religious character of the publications, including the newspaper. /d. at 
169-70, 173, 174,55 N.E.2d at 218,219,220. 
22 After the end of the Survey year, the case was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Nos. SJC-737-738 (April 1, 1977). 
23 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1497,348 N.E.2d 783. 
24 G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl.22d E, added by Acts of 1974, c. 831, § 3. 
25 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (1975). 
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which permits the Veterans Administration to take into account, in 
addition to the veteran's physical disability, his inability in fact, as a 
result of his disability, to obtain employment.26 The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a subjective rating based in part on the employability 
of the veteran, in addition to an objective disability rating based only 
on the type or extent of disability, was within the exemption. 27 Since 
Veterans Administration regulations predating the passage of the 
Massachusetts real estate exemption permitted either method for de-
termining a 100 percent disability rating and since the Legislature did 
not in the statute enacting the real estate exemption differentiate be-
tween the methods, the Court held that the Legislature must have in-
tended that a 100 percent disability rating arrived at by either method 
would be sufficient for purposes of determining the availability of the 
exemption.28 In addition, the Court held that its position did not 
make superfluous the further statutory requirement that the veteran 
be "incapable of working."29 The Court noted that it was possible for 
a veteran to be 1 00 percent disabled under the objective standard and 
still be capable of work. 30 Furthermore, the Court stated that the in-
clusion of the phrase "incapable of working" appeared to be an inde-
pendent statutory requirement and, as such, it was conceivable that a 
veteran might have a 100 percent disability rating based on the sub-
jective unemployability standard and still be determined by the asses-
sors to be capable of working. 31 
§7.12. Property Taxes: Legislation. There were few statutory 
changes in the Massachusetts property tax during the Survey year. 
The only significant amendment was made by chapter 853 of the Acts 
of 1975 which amended section 38 of chapter 59 of the General Laws 
so as to require the assessors of each city and town to submit annually 
to the state Tax Commission the valuation method or combination of 
methods that they proposed to use in making assessments for the 
coming year. Such methods may include comparison of sales prices, 
26 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1500-01, 348 N.E.2d at 785. There are two sections dealing 
with total disability of veterans under the federal regulations. Under 38 C.F.R. § 4.15 
(1975), a veteran is considered 100% disabled when he suffers from a disability which 
would make it impossible for the average person to be gainfully employed. Under § 
4.16, which was applicable for the plaintiff, a subjective standard is used: a veteran is 
considered 100% disabled when as a result of a combination of disabling injuries he is 
unable to be gainfully employed. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (1975). 
27 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1503, 1506, 348 N.E.2d at 786, 787. See note 26 supra. 
28 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1502-03, 348 N.E.2d at 785-86. 
29 !d. at 1505,348 N.E.2d at 786. G.L. c. 59, §5, cl.22d E. 
30 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1505, 348 N.E.2d at 786. 
31 [d. at 1505-06, 348 N.E.2d at 786-87. The Court did not hold that the statute re-
quired an independent inquiry into a veteran's employability, but merely stated "we 
would not at this time say that an independent determination of capability for work is 
in any and all circumstances foreclosed with respect to a veteran with a total disability 
rating based in part on unemployability." [d. at 1505,348 N.E.2d at 787. 
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capitalization of income, and replacement cost less depreciation.1 The 
Commission may recommend changes in the methods proposed;2 if 
the assessors do not accept the recommendations, they may appeal to 
the Appellate Tax Board whose decision shall be finai.3 
The only other amendments to chapter 59 were minor modifica-
tions of the procedure for appeal of real and personal property as-
sessments made pursuant to sections 64, 65, 65B, and 65C of that 
chapter.4 Section 3 of chapter 677 of the Acts of 1975 removed the 
time limit contained in section 65B, involved in Currens v. Board of As-
sessors of Boston,5 which had required a taxpayer to file an appeal 
within ten days from entry of an Appellate Tax Board order granting 
a motion to file an appeal without full payment of the tax.6 In addi-
tion, the procedure for late entry of appeals contained in section 65C 
now applies only if the board of assessors fails to notify the taxpayer 
of its inaction on his application for abatement within ten days, as re-
quired since 1975 by section 63 of chapter 59. 7 
§7.13. Sales, Use, and Meals Taxes. The primary developments 
during the Survey year in this area were legislative. The rate of the 
sales and use taxes was increased from three to five percent. 1 On the 
other hand, the meals excise tax was repealed, effective July 1, 1980.2 
For the period prior to the effective date of the repeal, however, the 
General Court broadened the tax by making meals under one dollar 
taxable.3 At the same time, definitions of "meal" and "restaurant" 
were added and rapidly amended so as to make it clear which sales by 
grocery stores, delicatessens, bakeries, and other such establishments 
were subject to tax.4 In addition, exemptions from the meals tax were 
added for meals served to students in primary and secondary schools 
and for meals served in hot lunch programs for the elderly.5 The 
procedural provisions with respect to the meals excise tax, formerly 
contained in sections 4 through 9 of chapter 64B were repealed,6 and 
a section was added making the comparable provisions of the sales tax 
applicable in this connection. 7 
§7.12. I Acts of 1975, c. 853, amending C.L. c. 59, § 38. 
• Id. 
ald. 
• Acts of 1975, c. 677, amending C.L. c. 59, §§ 64, 65, 65B, 65C. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1198, 1200,346 N.E.2d 849, 850. Currens is discussed at § 7.14, 
at notes 4-9 infra. 
6 C.L. c. 59, § 65B, as amended through Acts of 1945, c. 621, § 7. 
7 Acts of 1975, c. 677, § 4, amending C.L. c. 65C. 
§7.13. I C.L. c. 64H, § 2, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 59; C.L. c. 641, § 2, as 
amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 67. 
• Acts of 1975, c. 684, §§ 87, 97, repealing C.L. c. 64B. 
a C.L. c. 64B, § I, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 56. 
• C.L. c. 64B, § 1 as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 57 and Acts of 1975, c. 720, § 
1; C.L. c. 64B, § 2B, added by Acts of 1975, c. 720, § 2. 
• C.L. c. 64B, § 2A(e), (f) added by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 58. 
6 Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 96. 
7Id. See C.L. c. 64B, § 3. 
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In the only decision by the Supreme Judicial Court involving sales 
and use taxes, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Commission,8 the Court 
held, reversing the Appellate Tax Board, that advertising supple-
ments inserted in newspapers are themselves parts of newspapers and 
therefore exempt from sales and use taxes under section 6(m) of 
chapter 64H and section 7(b) of chapter 641 of the General Laws.9 
The Commissioner had claimed before the Board that the sale of such 
supplements by out-of-state printers to an in-state retailer for distribu-
tion as supplements to newspapers was a taxable sale. 10 The Appellate 
Tax Board agreed, distinguishing the case where such supplements 
are printed by the paper directly and therefore are clearly a part of 
the total newspaperY In a brief and largely conclusory opinion, the 
Supreme Judicial Court appeared to base its contrary decision on the 
fact that newspapers were intended to be free from sales and use 
taxes and that the tax at issue, even though it was imposed on a re-
tailer and not on the newspaper, might have the same economic im-
pact as a tax directly on the newspaper distributing the supplement. 12 
Even in the absence of any knowledge relative to what, if any, evi-
dence on this matter was presented to the Court, it appears doubtful 
that the tax would have any economic effect on the newspaper at all 
because the retailer would probably pass the tax on to his customers 
as an additional cost of printing the supplement. 
Another exemption for newspapers was involved in Attleboro Sun 
Publishing Corp. v. State Tax Commission. 13 Sections 6(r) and 6(s) of 
chapter 64H of the General Laws exempt, inter alia, materials and 
machinery "used directly and exlusively ... in the actual manufacture 
of tangible personal property to be sold, including the publishing of a 
newspaper."14 The Commissioner claimed that sales of certain materi-
als to a newspaper company for use in its printing process were not 
exempt under subsections (r) and (S).15 The Commissioner presuma-
bly attempted to distinguish Courier Citizen Co. v. Commissioner of Corpo-
rations and Taxation 16 on the basis of subsequent amendments to sub-
81976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 993, 345 N.E.2d 893. This case is also discussed at § 7.14, at 
note 1 infra. For a discussion of the Appellate Tax Board's decision, see Hines, State & 
Local Taxation, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.16, at 225-26. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 993-94, 345 N.E.2d at 894. 
10 Docket Nos. 64952 and 69000, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP" MASS. If 200-430, at 
10,353 (1975). 
11 Id. at 10,354. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 999,345 N.E.2d at 896. 
13 Docket Nos. 70135, 71045, 73977, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. 11 200-444 
(1975). 
14 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(r), as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 45. Section 6(s) exempts 
machinery "used directly and exclusively ... in an industrial plant in the actual man-
ufacture, conversion or processing of tangible personal property to be sold, including 
the publishing of a newspaper .... " A similarly worded provision in § 6(r) exempts 
materials. 
15 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. 11 299-444, at 10,384. 
16 358 Mass. 563, 266 N.E.2d 284 (1971). At issue in Courier was whether equipment 
such as photo-offset cameras, linotype and monotype machines which was necessary for 
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sections (r) and (S).17 The Appellate Tax Board held that the exemp-
tion was applicable, summarily rejecting the notion that the case was 
in any way distinguishable from the Courier Citizen case.18 
§7.14. Practice &: Procedure on Appeal. Several cases during the 
Survey year were decided against the appellant because of a failure to 
follow the prescribed procedure and/or a failure to preserve an ade-
quate record on appeal. Three cases involved a failure to meet a filing 
deadline, coupled in two instances with a record that considerably 
hampered the appellant's ability to present his argument either that 
he did not in fact file late or that his appeal should nonetheless be 
heard. 
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Commission,1 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court affirmed the Appellate Tax Board's holding that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the taxpayer's appeal of sales or use tax assessments 
for the months from January 1969 through December 1971 because 
the taxpayer did not appeal within ninety days after notice of the 
State Tax Commission's decision not to abate those assessments.2 The 
taxpayer had attempted to remedy the late filing by moving to amend 
a petition relating to taxes for November 1968, which was timely filed, 
so as to include the period from January 1969 to December 1971. 
However, the Court held that it was not within the Board's power to 
"create an exception to the time limit specified by the statutes."3 
Currens v. Board of Assessors oj Boston4 concerned the procedure for 
an appeal to the Appellate Tax Board under section 65B of chapter 
the end product of printed material but arguably not used "directly" in the process of 
the manufacture of the newspaper, was exempt under §§ 6(r) and 6(s). The Commis-
sioner of Corporations and Taxation argued that the equipment was used to produce 
composition for the manufacturer's own use and thus was not used directly in the man-
ufacture of tangible personal property to be sold. Id. at 565-66, 266 N.E.2d at 285. The 
Court rejected the Commissioner's argument, noting that the equipment had "no pur-
pose except in connection with a particular printing job." [d. at 567, 266 N.E.2d at 286. 
17 Prior to the Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 45, the words "exclusively" and "actual" were 
not included in the portion of subsections (r) and (s) quoted in the text. See 2 CCH 
STATE TAX REP .. MASS. 11 200-444, at 10,385. It would be very difficult to distinguish 
the Courier case on the basis of the change in statutory language since the Courier Court 
quoted with approval language from another case which said "[t]he words 'directly and 
exclusively' should not be construed to require the division into theoretically distinct stages rif what 
is in fact continuous and indivisible." 358 Mass. at 571-72, 266 N.E.2d at 289, quoting from 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Wanamaker, 286 N.Y. App. Div. 446, 449, 144 N.Y.S. 
2d 458, 462 (1955), affd, 2 N.Y.2d 764, 157 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973, 139 N.E.2d 150, 151 
(1956) (emphasis supplied by the Courier-Citizen Court). 
18 2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. .200-444, at 10,385. 
§7.14.1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 933, 345 N.E.2d 893. This case is also discussed at § 
7.13, at notes 8-12 supra. 
2 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 995-97, 345 N.E.2d at 895. See G.L. c. 64H, § 22; G.L. c. 
641, § 23. The decision of the Appellate Tax Board was reported at 2 CCH STATE TAX 
REP .. MASS. '200-430, at 10,352 (1975), and was discussed in Hines, State {$ Local 
Taxation, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.16, at 225-26. 
3 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 996, 345 N.E.2d at 895. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1198,346 N.E.2d 849. 
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59 of the General Laws. 5 At the time in question, section 65B pro-
vided that on payment of one-half the real estate tax assessed, a tax-
payer who claimed he was unable to pay the rest of the tax could peti-
tion the Appellate Tax Board for leave to file an appeal and such a 
petition would be heard by a single member of the Board, who could 
grant leave to appeal "within 10 days from the entry of said order 
upon such conditions as may be imposed therein .... "6 In Currens 
leave was granted, but the taxpayer mistakenly did not file his appeal 
until after expiration of the ten days.7 Three years later he petitioned 
the Board to amend its original order by extending the time for filing 
so as to include the date he filed. 8 The Board denied the motion after 
a hearing without giving any reason, and the taxpayer appealed this 
denial. 9 
It appears that the Supreme Judicial Court's earlier decision in 
Louvre, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston 10 would have provided ample author-
ity for the Court in Currens to hold that the ten-day limit was required 
by statute and was not within the power of the Board to extend. ll In-
stead, although quoting the substance of the Louvre decision,12 the 
Court stated that "[t]he requested amendment [extending the time to 
file], if made nunc pro tunc, might prevail against any argument by 
the assessors that the application had not been seasonably filed .... "13 
However, the Court went on to state that since the taxpayer's motion 
had been denied without any reason, there was no basis in the record 
for holding that "the board ever inferred, found or decided that the 
taxpayer's failure to file within the original time limit was due to any 
excusable neglect or was for other good cause shown."14 In addition, 
5 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1199-1200,346 N.E.2d at 850. 
6 C.L. c. 59, § 65B, as amended through Acts of 1945, c. 621, § 7. The statute has since 
been again amended, eliminating, inter alia, the ten day filing requirement. C.L. c. 59, § 
65B as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 677, § 3. See § 7.12, at notes 4-6 supra. 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1200, 345 N.E.2d at 850. 
8 [d. at 1201, 345 N.E.2d at 850. 
9/d. at 1202, 345 N.E.2d at 851. In view of the evident lack of an order by the Board 
denying the applications for abatement, the Court pointed out that there was some 
question as to the ripeness of the case for appeal. However, it did not pursue this point 
since neither of the parties had raised it. [d. at 1199, n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 850, n.1. 
10 319 Mass. 727, 66 N.E.2d 711 (1946). 
11 In Louvre which had essentially the same fact situation as Currens, the Court stated 
that "[t]he appeal of the taxpayer filed more than ten days [after the order of the 
Board] had no standing and could be given none by the board either as matter of right 
or as matter of discretion. The statute must be strictly followed." [d. at 727, 66 N.E.2d 
at 712. The Currens taxpayer attempted to distinguish Louvre on three grounds: (1) in 
Currens, unlike in Louvre, the taxpayer filed a motion to amend the Board's order so as 
to increase the original time limit for filing the application for abatement; (2) the 
Currens assessors did not move to dismiss the application on the ground of late filing, 
whereas the Louvre assessors did; (3) the rules governing civil procedure and their in-
terpretation had been liberalized in the interim between Louvre and Currens. The Court 
rejected these distinctions as not relevant to the relief that the taxpayer was requesting 
from the Court. Currens, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1203,346 N.E.2d at 851. 
12 Currens, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1202,346 N.E.2d at 851. 
13 [d. at 1201, 346 N.E.2d at 850. 
14 [d. at 1204, 346 N.E.2d at 852. 
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the Court refused to consider the taxpayer's claim that the assessors 
had agreed to an abatement until they discovered that he had filed 
late, because this allegation was "not stated or incorporated in the 
record on appeal."15 
The taxpayer in the Currens case should at least have presented all 
of his evidence in the affidavit in support of his motion before the 
Board as to the facts that he subsequently raised in his brief before 
the Supreme Judicial Court. More importantly, he could have insured 
that there would be written findings as to the reasons for the Board's 
denial of his motion. The Board might have taken the position that in 
decisions on a motion it cannot be required, pursuant to the request 
of a party, to issue a report of findings of fact and rulings of law. In 
that event, however, the taxpayer could have pursued the case to a 
final dispositive order and at that time made a request for findings of 
fact and rulings of law pursuant to the Board's Rule 29. 16 Had the 
Board found the facts in the taxpayer's favor but the law, under the 
Louvre decision, against him, the issue of law that the Court was able 
to skirt on the record before it would have been squarely presented. 
In Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. Board of Assessors of Dartmouth, 17 
the issue was whether the taxpayer had in fact failed to meet a filing 
deadline. IS The Supreme Judicial Court held that the appellant, by 
not requesting a transcript of the proceedings before the Appellate 
Tax Board, was precluded from claiming that the Board's finding that 
the appellant had filed late was not warranted by the evidence. 19 In 
addition, the appellant did not raise before the Board its legal argu-
ments as to why in the circumstances its late filing, assuming there 
was one, should be ignored.20 Therefore, the appellant was also pre-
cluded from raising these arguments on appeal under section 13 of 
chapter 58A of the General Laws. 21 
Board of Assessors of Provincetown v. Vara-Sorrentino Realty Trust22 was 
decided against the appellant, the board of assessors, on the ground 
that the record was too sketchy to support the facts alleged. 23 The 
15Jd. at 1205, 346 N.E.2d at 852. 
16 Appellate Tax Board Rule 29, 2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. 11 89-284. 
17 1975 Mass.,Adv. Sh. 3018, 335 N.E.2d 897. 
18Jd. at 3019-20, 335 N.E.2d at 899. 
19Jd. at 3024-25, 335 N.E.2d at 901, citing G.L. c. 58A, § 13, as appearing in Acts of 
1973, c. 1114, § 5, G.L. c. 58A, § 10. The appellant attempted to remedy the error by 
filing a motion after the proceedings to have a transcript included in the record, but its 
motion was denied. This denial was not appealed, but the Court indicated its approval 
in dictum. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3020 n.3, 3025 n.lO, 335 N.E.2d at 899 n.3, 901 
n.lO. 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3025-26, 335 N.E.2d at 901. 
21Jd. at 3026, 335 N.E.2d at 901-02. The Court rejected the taxpayer's contention 
that since the legal issue raised on appeal was based on the federal constitution, it need 
not have been presented to the Appellate Tax Board. [d. at 3026-27, 335 N.E.2d at 
901-02. 
22 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 407, 341 N.E.2d 649. 
23Jd. at 409, 412, 341 N.E.2d at 650, 651. 
25
Hall: Chapter 7: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
§7.14 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 251 
case involved an appeal of the Appellate Tax Board's grant of a 
property tax abatement to a "hotel-restaurant-bar-shop complex" 
using a capitalization of income approach.24 The appeal was based on 
the argument that the assessors could not adequately employ a 
capitalization of income approach due to the owner's failure to supply 
them with the necessary information with respect to receipts and 
expenses.25 The Supreme Judicial Court, however, did not find suffi-
cient facts in the record to support this claim.26 In addition, the Court 
pointed out that no review of the substance of the Board's decision 
was possible since the evidence before the Board was not reported.27 
In another case involving the lack of record on appeal, a finding 
could have been made against the appellant assessors because of a 
procedural flaw but since a decision on the merits would reach the 
same result, the Court proceeded to consider the merits. 28 Beardsley v. 
Board of Assessors of Foxborough,29 like Bedford Gas, involved a question 
of the substantiality of evidenc~ to support a finding of the Appellate 
Tax Board.30 In Beardsley, the lack of a transcript was excused because 
the evidence was largely documentary and appeared in the exhibits 
and the Board's findings and report. 31 However, the assessors failed 
to request a ruling from the Board that the evidence did not warrant 
the finding in question, and the Court stated in dictum that this fail-
ure "will justify an affirmation of the decision of the Board because 
nothing ... [is] properly before us for review."32 
24 [d. at 407-08,341 N.E.2d at 649-50. 
25 [d. at 409,341 N.E.2d at 650. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. at 408,341 N.E.2d at 650. 
28 Beardsley v. Board of Assessors of Foxborough, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 646, 647 n.3, 
343 N .E.2d 359, 360 n.3. 
29 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 646, 343 N.E.2d 359. 
30 [d. at 647-49,343 N.E.2d at 360-61. 
31 [d. at 647 n.3, 343 N.E.2d at 360 n.3. 
32 [d. 
26
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